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Breaking and Mending Resilient Mix-Nets

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Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2760))

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Abstract

In this paper we show two attacks against universally resilient mix-nets. The first attack can be used against a number of mix-nets, including Furukawa-Sako01 [6], Millimix [11], Abe98 [1], MiP-1, MiP-2 [2,3] and Neff01 [19]. We give the details of the attack in the case of Furukawa-Sako01 mix-net. The second attack breaks the correctness of Millimix [11]. We show how to counter these attacks, and give efficiency and security analysis for the proposed countermeasures.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Technology and Computer Science, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 2522, Australia

    Lan Nguyen & Rei Safavi-Naini

Authors
  1. Lan Nguyen
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  2. Rei Safavi-Naini
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The Free Haven Project,  

    Roger Dingledine

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Nguyen, L., Safavi-Naini, R. (2003). Breaking and Mending Resilient Mix-Nets. In: Dingledine, R. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2760. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40956-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40956-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20610-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40956-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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