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Effizienzorientierte Begründungen für Umverteilung

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Ökonomie des Sozialstaats

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(2007). Effizienzorientierte Begründungen für Umverteilung. In: Ökonomie des Sozialstaats. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40940-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40940-3_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40939-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40940-3

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