Skip to main content

Compact Conversion Schemes for the Probabilistic OW-PCA Primitives

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2836))

Abstract

In this paper, we propose two new generic conversion schemes which generate IND-CCA security from probabilistic public key encryption primitives, given that the underlying primitives are OW-PCA secure in the random oracle model.

Compared to the previous generic conversions (GEM, REACT, etc.), both of our proposals have the advantage of compactness (if the input size of the public key encryption primitive is large), which is especially meaningful in the bandwidth-saving channels. Note that the latter one of our proposals has not necessarily to carry out the re-encryption for validity check, which will accelerate the decryption greatly.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random Oracles Are Practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In: Proc. First Annual Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM Press, New York (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Optimal Asymmetric Encryption – How to Encrypt with RSA. In: De Santis, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1994. LNCS, vol. 950, pp. 92–111. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Coron, J., Handschuh, H., Joye, M., Paillier, P., Pointcheval, D., Tymen, C.: GEM: A Generic Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Encryption Method. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) CT-RSA 2002. LNCS, vol. 2271, pp. 263–276. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. ElGamal, T.: A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on the Discrete Logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-31(4), 469–472 (1985)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions of Identification and Signature Problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T.: How to Enhance the Security of Public-Key Encryption at Minimum Cost. In: Imai, H., Zheng, Y. (eds.) PKC 1999. LNCS, vol. 1560, pp. 53–68. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T.: Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 537–554. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T., Pointcheval, D., Stern, J.: RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 260–274. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Kobara, K., Imai, H.: OAEP++: A very simple way to apply OAEP to deterministic OW-CPA primitives (August 2002) (manuscript), http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/130

  10. Okamoto, T., Pointcheval, D.: The Gap-Problems: A New Class of Problems for the Security of Cryptographic Schemes. In: Kim, K.-c. (ed.) PKC 2001. LNCS, vol. 1992, pp. 104–118. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Okamoto, T., Pointcheval, D.: REACT: Rapid Enhanced-Security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform. In: Naccache, D. (ed.) CT-RSA 2001. LNCS, vol. 2020, pp. 159–175. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Okamoto, T., Uchiyama, S.: A New Public-Key Cryptosystem as Secure as Factoring. In: Nyberg, K. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1998. LNCS, vol. 1403, pp. 308–318. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Paillier, P.: Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 223–238. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Pointcheval, D.: Chosen-Ciphertext Security for Any One-Way Cryptosystem. In: Imai, H., Zheng, Y. (eds.) PKC 2000. LNCS, vol. 1751, pp. 129–146. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Rackoff, C., Simon, D.: Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 433–444. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Cui, Y., Kobara, K., Imai, H. (2003). Compact Conversion Schemes for the Probabilistic OW-PCA Primitives. In: Qing, S., Gollmann, D., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2836. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39927-8_25

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39927-8_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20150-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-39927-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics