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A Structured Operational Modelling of the Dolev-Yao Threat Model

  • Wenbo Mao
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2845)

Abstract

In the areas of computer security and cryptography a standard model for adversaries is the Dolev-Yao threat model. In the areas of formal analysis of complex, concurrent, communication and reactive systems, one of the foundations for formal analysis methodologies is a structured operational semantics (SOS) for Milner’s process algebra Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). In this paper we provide a CCS-SOS modelling of the Dolev-Yao threat model. The intuitively appealing modelling indicates a suitability for the well studied formal analysis methodologies based on CCS-SOS being applied to computer security and cryptography.

Keywords

Model Check Security Protocol Computer Security System Composition Threat Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wenbo Mao
    • 1
  1. 1.Hewlett-Packard LaboratoriesBristolUnited Kingdom

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