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Quangos — An Unknown Species in German Public Law? German Report on the Rulemaking Power of Independent Administrative Agencies

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Book cover Recent Trends in German and European Constitutional Law

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 188))

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Abstract

Quangos are not specifically mentioned in the German Constitution, nor can the term be found directly in the administrative acts of the Federal government and its states. Textbooks and law journal articles on Administrative or Constitutional Law very rarely mention Quangos.1 Are Quangos therefore an unknown species in German Public Law? Compared to Germany, the picture in the United Kingdom seems to be totally different. It is said that there are hundreds, if not thousands of Quangos within the British Government. It is therefore not surprising that the term „Quangos“ — short for quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations — was invented in the United Kingdom. At first, “non-governmental” was understood in a literal sense and restricted to private organizations. Nowadays, Quangos are seen as part of the government in a broad sense (e.g. in terms of funding, appointment and function), yet hold an independent status within the governmental structure to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore, “non-governmental” is typically defined as “non-ministerial” or “non-departmental”, and the term Non-Departmental Public Bodies is more often used to describe the phenomenon of independent administrative organizations or agencies.2

The author thanks stud. iur. Karen Andress for her expert language assistance.

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References

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  1. Faculty of Law and Economics, University of Mannheim, (Germany)

    Kristian Fischer Dr. iur. (Professor of Law)

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  1. Kristian Fischer Dr. iur.
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Eibe Riedel Rüdiger Wolfrum

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© 2006 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V.

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Fischer, K. (2006). Quangos — An Unknown Species in German Public Law? German Report on the Rulemaking Power of Independent Administrative Agencies. In: Riedel, E., Wolfrum, R. (eds) Recent Trends in German and European Constitutional Law. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 188. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37720-7_6

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