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Credible Threats as an Instrument of Regulation for Network Industries

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Book cover Digital Economic Dynamics

Abstract

One of the major success stories for microeconomists involves the fundament forms that have taken place in nehvork industries within the last 20 years. In many countries, the institutional framework under which utility and other network industries operate has changed significantly, involving aspects of privatisation, liberalisation eralisation and de- and re-regulation. However, even though the institul framework has changed for the better in many countries so that efficiency has improved in most liberalised network industries, there is a still a vivid and ongoing debate about the proper balance between regulation and competition policy, or more generally, about the efficiency of various regulatory frameworks. Today, the focus of this discussion is on the questions of (a) how over-regulation can be avoided and (b) how and under what circumstances intrusive heavy-handed sector specific regulation can be substituted by reliance on competition law or at least a more light-handed approach.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Ruhr-University of Bochum, Bochum

    Justus Haucap, Ulrich Heimeshoff & André Uhde

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  1. Justus Haucap
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  2. Ulrich Heimeshoff
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  3. André Uhde
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. EIIW —European Institute for International Economic Relations, University of Wuppertal, Rainer-Gruenter-Straße 21, 42119, Wuppertal, Germany

    Paul J. J. Welfens

  2. HPI — Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam, Prof.-Dr. Helmert-Straße 2-3, 14482, Potsdam, Germany

    Mathias Weske

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Haucap, J., Heimeshoff, U., Uhde, A. (2007). Credible Threats as an Instrument of Regulation for Network Industries. In: Welfens, P.J.J., Weske, M. (eds) Digital Economic Dynamics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-36030-8_9

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