Revising Beliefs Through Arguments: Bridging the Gap Between Argumentation and Belief Revision in MAS

  • Fabio Paglieri
  • Cristiano Castelfranchi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3366)

Abstract

This paper compares within the MAS framework two separate threads in the formal study of epistemic change: belief revision and argumentation theories. Belief revision describes how an agent is supposed to change his own mind, while argumentation deals with persuasive strategies employed to change the mind of other agents. These are two sides (cognitive and social) of the same epistemic coin: argumentation theories are incomplete, if they cannot be grounded in belief revision models – and vice versa. Nonetheless, so far the formal treatment of belief revision mostly neglected any systematic comparison with argumentation theories. In MAS such problem becomes evident and inescapable: belief change is usually triggered by communication and persuasion from other agents, involving deception, trust, reputation, negotiation, conflict resolution (all typical issues faced by argumentation-based models). Therefore, a closer comparison between belief revision and argumentation is a necessary preliminary step towards an integrated model of epistemic change in MAS.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabio Paglieri
    • 1
  • Cristiano Castelfranchi
    • 2
  1. 1.University of SienaSienaItaly
  2. 2.Institute of Cognitive Sciences and TechnologiesNational Research Council (ISTC-CNR)RomaItaly

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