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An Investigation into the Use of Group Dynamics for Solving Social Dilemmas

  • Tomohisa Yamashita
  • Kiyoshi Izumi
  • Koichi Kurumatani
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3415)

Abstract

In this research, we propose some group dynamics that promote cooperative behavior in systems with social dilemmas and hence enhances their performance. If cooperative behavior among self-interest individuals is established, effective distribution of resources and useful allocation of tasks based on coalition formation can be realized. In order to realize these group dynamics, we extend the partner choice mechanisms for 2-IPD to that for N-person Dilemma game. Furthermore, we propose group split based on metanorm as a new group dynamic. A series of evolutionary simulations confirm that this group dynamic: i) establishes and maintains cooperation, and ii) enhances the performance of the systems consisting of self-interest players in Social Dilemmas situations.

Keywords

Multiagent System Average Payoff Group Dynamic Cooperative Behavior Coalition Formation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tomohisa Yamashita
    • 1
  • Kiyoshi Izumi
    • 1
  • Koichi Kurumatani
    • 1
  1. 1.Cyber Assist Research Center (CARC)National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)TokyoJapan

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