Abstract
It is a common behavior that a group of rational agents cooperate together as a bidder/seller to bid in an auction. How to determine the group bidding price and how to share the profit among the members in a group has been problems that are not studied thoroughly. In time-critical auctions, the problem is getting more complicated since the group has to decide new bidding prices within time limits. Conventional approaches used a centralized mechanism to assign profit share to each bidding agent in the group that usually lead to negative profit of individual bidding agent. We propose a distributed approach called Z-process that allows individual bidding agents to declare their compromised profit share based on their rationalities, and determines the group bidding prices simultaneously. We show that in Z-process there exists a dominant strategy for rational agents that can let them obtain maximum profit. We can also show that the compromised profit of each individual bidding agent by Z-process satisfies each agent’s rationality.
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Hsu, MC., Soo, VW. (2005). Price Determination and Profit Sharing for Bidding Groups in Agent-Mediated Auctions. In: Barley, M.W., Kasabov, N. (eds) Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3371. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32128-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32128-6_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-25340-2
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