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Handling Expected Polynomial-Time Strategies in Simulation-Based Security Proofs

  • Jonathan Katz
  • Yehuda Lindell
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3378)

Abstract

The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of strict polynomial-time probabilistic machines (or circuits). However, expected polynomial-time machines are often also considered. For example, there are many zero-knowledge protocols for which the only simulation techniques known run in expected (and not strict) polynomial-time. In addition, it has been shown that expected polynomial-time simulation is essential for achieving constant-round black-box zero-knowledge protocols. This reliance on expected polynomial-time simulation introduces a number of conceptual and technical difficulties. In this paper, we develop techniques for dealing with expected polynomial-time adversaries in the context of simulation-based security proofs.

Keywords

Pseudorandom Function Auxiliary Input Honest Party Oracle Query Composition Theorem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Katz
    • 1
  • Yehuda Lindell
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceBar-Ilan UniversityIsrael

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