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The Relationship Between Password-Authenticated Key Exchange and Other Cryptographic Primitives

  • Minh-Huyen Nguyen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3378)

Abstract

We consider the problem of password-authenticated key exchange (PAK) also known as session-key generation using passwords: constructing session-key generation protocols that are secure against active adversaries (person-in-the-middle) and only require the legitimate parties to share a low-entropy password (e.g. coming from a dictionary of size poly(n)).

We study the relationship between PAK and other cryptographic primitives. The main result of this paper is that password-authenticated key exchange and public-key encryption are incomparable under black-box reductions. In addition, we strengthen previous results by Halevi and Krawczyk [14] and Boyarsky [5] and show how to build key agreement and semi-honest oblivious transfer from any PAK protocol that is secure for the Goldreich-Lindell (GL) definition [11].

We highlight the difference between two existing definitions of PAK, namely the indistinguishability-based definition of Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway (BPR) [1] and the simulation-based definition of Goldreich and Lindell [11] by showing that there exists a PAK protocol that is secure for the BPR definition and only assumes the existence of one-way functions in the case of exponential-sized dictionaries. Hence, unlike the GL definition, the BPR definition does not imply semi-honest oblivious transfer for exponental-sized dictionaries under black-box reductions.

Keywords

Security Parameter Oblivious Transfer Honest Party Common Reference String Honest Parti 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Minh-Huyen Nguyen
    • 1
  1. 1.Harvard UniversityCambridge

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