Sufficient Conditions for Collision-Resistant Hashing

  • Yuval Ishai
  • Eyal Kushilevitz
  • Rafail Ostrovsky
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3378)


We present several new constructions of collision-resistant hash-functions (CRHFs) from general assumptions. We start with a simple construction of CRHF from any homomorphic encryption. Then, we strengthen this result by presenting constructions of CRHF from two other primitives that are implied by homomorphic-encryption: one-round private information retrieval (PIR) protocols and homomorphic one-way commitments.


Collision-resistant hash functions homomorphic encryption private information-retrieval 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuval Ishai
    • 1
  • Eyal Kushilevitz
    • 1
  • Rafail Ostrovsky
    • 2
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentTechnionHaifaIsrael
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentUCLA 

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