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Upper and Lower Bounds on Black-Box Steganography

  • Nenad Dedić
  • Gene Itkis
  • Leonid Reyzin
  • Scott Russell
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3378)

Abstract

We study the limitations of steganography when the sender is not using any properties of the underlying channel beyond its entropy and the ability to sample from it. On the negative side, we show that the number of samples the sender must obtain from the channel is exponential in the rate of the stegosystem. On the positive side, we present the first secret-key stegosystem that essentially matches this lower bound regardless of the entropy of the underlying channel. Furthermore, for high-entropy channels, we present the first secret-key stegosystem that matches this lower bound statelessly (i.e., without requiring synchronized state between sender and receiver).

Keywords

Shared State Pseudorandom Function Description Size Passive Adversary History Length 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nenad Dedić
    • 1
  • Gene Itkis
    • 1
  • Leonid Reyzin
    • 1
  • Scott Russell
    • 1
  1. 1.Boston University Computer ScienceBostonUSA

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