Abstract
Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to attack 6,7,8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key and 8,9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. The attack on 6-round of 128-bit key Camellia is more efficient than known attacks. The complexities of the attack on 7(8,9,10)-round Camellia without FL /FL − − 1 functions are less than that of previous attacks. Furthermore, we prove that the 4-round primitive-wise idealized Camellia is not pseudorandom permutation and the 5-round primitive-wise idealized Camellia is super-pseudorandom permutation for non-adaptive adversaries.
This work was supported by Chinese Natural Science Foundation (Grant No.60373047 and 60025205) and 863 Project (Grant No. 2003AA14403).
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aoki, K., Ichikawa, T., Kanda, M., Matsui, M., Moriai, S., Nakajima, J., Tokita, T.: Specification of Camellia-a 128-bit Block Cipher. In: SAC 2000, pp. 183–191. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Kawabata, T., Kaneko, T.: A study on higher order differential attack of Camellia. In: Proceedings of the 2nd NESSIE workshop (2001)
Hatano, Y., Sekine, H., Kaneko, T.: Higher order differential attack of Camellia(II). In: Nyberg, K., Heys, H.M. (eds.) SAC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2595, pp. 39–56. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Lee, S., Hong, S., Lee, S., Lim, J., Yoon, S.: Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis of Camellia. In: Kim, K.-c. (ed.) ICISC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2288, pp. 32–38. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Sugita, M., Kobara, K., Imai, H.: Security of reduced version of the block cipher Camellia against truncated and impossible differential cryptanalysis. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 193–207. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Shirai, T., Kanamaru, S., Abe, G.: Improved upper bounds of differential and linear characteristic probability for Camellia. In: Daemen, J., Rijmen, V. (eds.) FSE 2002. LNCS, vol. 2365, pp. 128–142. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Ye-ping, H., Si-han, Q.: Square attack on Reduced Camellia Cipher. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds.) ICICS 2001. LNCS, vol. 2229, pp. 238–245. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Yeom, Y., Park, S., Kim, I.: On the security of Camellia against the square attack. In: Kohavi, R., Masand, B., Spiliopoulou, M., Srivastava, J. (eds.) WebKDD 2001. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 2356, pp. 89–99. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Yeom, Y., Park, I., Kim, I.: A study of Integral type cryptanalysis on Camellia. In: The 2003 Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security-SCIS 2003 (2003)
Luby, M., Rackoff, C.: How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions. SIAM Journal on Computing 17(2), 373–386 (1988)
Patarin, J.: New results on pseudorandom permutation generators based on the DES scheme. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 301–312. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)
Maurer, U.M.: A simplified and generalized treatment of Luby-Rackoff pseudorandom permutation generators. In: Rueppel, R.A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 658, pp. 239–255. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Vaudenay, S.: Provable security for block ciphers by decorrelation. In: Meinel, C., Morvan, M. (eds.) STACS 1998. LNCS, vol. 1373, pp. 249–275. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Iwata, T., Kurosawa, K.: On the Pseudorandomness of the AES Finalists-RC6 and Serpent. In: Schneier, B. (ed.) FSE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1978, pp. 231–243. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Naor, M., Reingold, O.: On the construction of pseudorandom permutations Luby-Rackoff revisited. Journal of Cryptology 12(1), 29–66 (1999)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Wenling, W., Dengguo, F., Hua, C. (2004). Collision Attack and Pseudorandomness of Reduced-Round Camellia. In: Handschuh, H., Hasan, M.A. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3357. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30564-4_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30564-4_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24327-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30564-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)