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Blind Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures for Ad Hoc Groups

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 3313))

Abstract

Spontaneous anonymous group (SAG) cryptography is a fundamental alternative to achieve thresholding without group secret or setup. It has gained wide interests in applications to ad hoc groups. We present a general construction of blind SAG 1-out-of-n and t-out-of-n signature schemes from essentially any major blind signature. In the case when our scheme is built from blind Schnorr (resp. Okamoto-Schnorr) signature, the parallel one-more unforgeability is reduced to Schnorr’s ROS Problem in the random oracle model plus the generic group model. In the process of our derivations, we obtain a generalization of Schnorr’s result [17] from single public key to multiple public keys.

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Chan, T.K., Fung, K., Liu, J.K., Wei, V.K. (2005). Blind Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures for Ad Hoc Groups. In: Castelluccia, C., Hartenstein, H., Paar, C., Westhoff, D. (eds) Security in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks. ESAS 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3313. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30496-8_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30496-8_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24396-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30496-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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