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Adaptive-CCA on OpenPGP Revisited

  • Hsi-Chung Lin
  • Sung-Ming Yen
  • Guan-Ting Chen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3269)

Abstract

E-mail system has become one of the most important and popular Internet services. Instead of using traditional surface mail, we have the alternative of employing e-mail system which provides a reliable and efficient message delivery. However, in the electronic era, privacy, data integrity, and authentication requirements turn out to be especially unavoidable. Secure e-mail system specifications and software developments have been widely discussed in the past decade. Among which OpenPGP is a widespread and well known specification, and PGP becomes a famous implementation. But only limited security analyses on both theoretical and practical aspects about secure e-mail system has been considered previously. In this paper, new chosen ciphertext attacks against the latest version of OpenPGP are proposed with detailed analysis. Furthermore, a new vulnerability due to system version backward compatibility will be pointed out.

Keywords

Chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) E-mail Encryption mode Message format OpenPGP PGP 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hsi-Chung Lin
    • 1
  • Sung-Ming Yen
    • 1
  • Guan-Ting Chen
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security (LCIS), Department of Computer Science and Information EngineeringNational Central UniversityChung-LiTaiwan R.O.C.

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