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Transient Fault Induction Attacks on XTR

  • Mathieu Ciet
  • Christophe Giraud
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3269)

Abstract

At Crypto 2000, the public-key system XTR was introduced by Lenstra and Verheul. This system uses an efficient and compact method to represent subgroup elements. Application of XTR in cryptographic protocols, such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement, El Gamal encryption or DSA signature, greatly reduces the computational cost without compromising security. XTR in the presence of a fault, i.e. when processing under unexpected conditions, has never been studied. This paper presents four different fault analyses and shows how an error during the XTR exponentiation can be exploited by a malicious adversary to recover a part or the totality of the secret parameter. Countermeasures are also presented to counteract fault attacks. They are very simple to implement and induce a negligible performance penalty in terms of both memory and time.

Keywords

Differential fault analysis public-key system XTR countermeasures smart cards 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mathieu Ciet
    • 1
  • Christophe Giraud
    • 2
  1. 1.Innova CardLa CiotatFrance
  2. 2.Oberthur Card SystemsPuteauxFrance

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