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Automatic Covert Channel Analysis of a Multilevel Secure Component

  • Ruggero Lanotte
  • Andrea Maggiolo-Schettini
  • Simone Tini
  • Angelo Troina
  • Enrico Tronci
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3269)

Abstract

The NRL Pump protocol defines a multilevel secure component whose goal is to minimize leaks of information from high level systems to lower level systems, without degrading average time performances. We define a probabilistic model for the NRL Pump and show how a probabilistic model checker (FHP-murϕ) can be used to estimate the capacity of a probabilistic covert channel in the NRL Pump. We are able to compute the probability of a security violation as a function of time for various configurations of the system parameters (e.g. buffer sizes, moving average size, etc). Because of the model complexity, our results cannot be obtained using an analytical approach and, because of the low probabilities involved, it can be hard to obtain them using a simulator.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruggero Lanotte
    • 1
  • Andrea Maggiolo-Schettini
    • 2
  • Simone Tini
    • 1
  • Angelo Troina
    • 2
  • Enrico Tronci
    • 3
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Scienze della Cultura, Politiche e dell’InformazioneUniversità dell’Insubria 
  2. 2.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità di Pisa 
  3. 3.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità di Roma “La Sapienza” 

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