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Reflector Attack Traceback System with Pushback Based iTrace Mechanism

  • Hyung-Woo Lee
  • Sung-Hyun Yun
  • Taekyoung Kwon
  • Jae-Sung Kim
  • Hee-Un Park
  • Nam-Ho Oh
Conference paper
  • 706 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3269)

Abstract

Reflector attack belongs to one of the most serious types of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, which can hardly be traced by traceback techniques, since the marked information written by any routers between the attacker and the reflectors will be lost in the replied packets from the reflectors. In response to such attacks, advanced IP traceback technology must be suggested. This study proposed an improved iTrace technique that identifies DDoS traffics with Pushback based multi-hop iTrace mechanism based on authenticated packet marking information at reflector for malicious reflector source trace and cope with DDoS attack packets efficiently.

Keywords

Reflector Attack iTrace Authenticated Packet Marking 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hyung-Woo Lee
    • 1
  • Sung-Hyun Yun
    • 2
  • Taekyoung Kwon
    • 3
  • Jae-Sung Kim
    • 4
  • Hee-Un Park
    • 4
  • Nam-Ho Oh
    • 4
  1. 1.Dept. of SoftwareHanshin UniversityOsan, GyunggiKorea
  2. 2.Div. of Information and Communication EngineeringCheonan UniversityChungnamKorea
  3. 3.School of Computer EngineeringSejong UniversitySeoulKorea
  4. 4.Korea Information Security AgencySeoulKorea

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