Abstract
This research presents a software-based computer forensics method capable of recovering and storing digital evidence from volatile memory without corrupting the hard drive. Acquisition of volatile memory is difficult because it must be transferred onto non-volatile memory prior to disrupting power. If this data is transferred onto the hard drive of the compromised computer it could destroy critical evidence. This research will enhance investigations by allowing the inclusion of hidden processes, kernel modules, and kernel modifications present only in memory that may have otherwise been neglected. This methodology can be applied to any operating system and has been proven through implementation on Linux.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ring, S., Cole, E. (2004). Volatile Memory Computer Forensics to Detect Kernel Level Compromise. In: Lopez, J., Qing, S., Okamoto, E. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3269. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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