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Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets

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Algorithms – ESA 2004 (ESA 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3221))

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Abstract

Negotiation-range mechanisms offer a novel approach to achieving efficient markets based on finding the maximum weighted matching in a weighted bipartite graph connecting buyers and sellers. Unlike typical markets, negotiation-range mechanisms establish negotiation terms between paired bidders rather than set a final price for each transaction. This subtle difference allows single-unit heterogenous negotiation-range markets to achieve desirable properties that cannot coexist in typical markets. This paper extends the useful properties of negotiation-range mechanisms to include coalition-resistance, making them the first markets known to offer protection from coalitions. Additionally, the notion of negotiation-range mechanisms is extended to include a restricted setting of combinatorial markets.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

    Rica Gonen

Authors
  1. Rica Gonen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Freiburg, Georges Köhler Allee 79, 79110, Freiburg, Germany

    Susanne Albers

  2. Department of Computer Science, King’s College, WC2R 2LS, London, UK

    Tomasz Radzik

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gonen, R. (2004). Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets. In: Albers, S., Radzik, T. (eds) Algorithms – ESA 2004. ESA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3221. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30140-0_35

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30140-0_35

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-23025-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30140-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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