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International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming

ICALP 2004: Automata, Languages and Programming pp 345–357Cite as

Coordination Mechanisms

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3142))

Abstract

We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and non-colluding agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.

Research supported in part by the IST (FLAGS, IST-2001-33116) program and by NSF.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Informatics, University of Athens, Panepistimiopolis Ilisia, Athens, 15784, Greece

    George Christodoulou & Elias Koutsoupias

  2. Computer Science Department, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, 90095, USA.

    Akash Nanavati

Authors
  1. George Christodoulou
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  2. Elias Koutsoupias
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  3. Akash Nanavati
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informatics, Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord - Ed. Omega, 240 Jordi Girona Salgado, 1-3 E-08034, Barcelona

    Josep Díaz

  2. Department of Mathematics and Turku Centre for Computer Science TUCS, University of Turku, 20014, Turku, Finland

    Juhani Karhumäki

  3. Department of Mathematics, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

    Arto Lepistö

  4. Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science, University of Edinburgh,  

    Donald Sannella

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E., Nanavati, A. (2004). Coordination Mechanisms. In: Díaz, J., Karhumäki, J., Lepistö, A., Sannella, D. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3142. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_31

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_31

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22849-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-27836-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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