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A New Method for Securing Elliptic Scalar Multiplication Against Side-Channel Attacks

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3108))

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Abstract

This paper presents a new method for elliptic scalar multiplication with protection against side-channel attacks. We first point out some potential security flaws often overlooked in most previous algorithms and then present a simple ±1-signed encoding scheme that can be used to enhance the security and performance of existing algorithms. In particular, we propose and analyze concrete signed binary and window algorithms based on the proposed ±1-signed encoding. The security of window-family algorithms against a DPA-style attack is also discussed with some possible countermeasures.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Internet Engineering, Sejong University, 98 Gunja-Dong, Kwangjin-Gu, Seoul, 143-747, KOREA

    Chae Hoon Lim

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  1. Chae Hoon Lim
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Advanced Computing - Algorithms and Cryptography Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Australia

    Huaxiong Wang

  2. Department of Computing, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Sydney, Australia

    Josef Pieprzyk

  3. Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

    Vijay Varadharajan

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Lim, C.H. (2004). A New Method for Securing Elliptic Scalar Multiplication Against Side-Channel Attacks. In: Wang, H., Pieprzyk, J., Varadharajan, V. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3108. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22379-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-27800-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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