Abstract
This chapter is devoted to Nash-consistent mechanisms, that is mechanisms possessing Nash equilibria at every preference profile. In Section 2.1, we examine a few examples, then proceed to investigate blockings generated by Nash-consistent mechanisms (Section 2.2). In Section 2.3, we show that the correspondence of equilibrium outcomes exhibit a somewhat stronger property than monotonicity, which is called strong monotonicity. In Section 2.4, we describe Nash-implementable SCCs. In the more-than-two-agents case, the class of Nash-implementable SCCs coincides with the class of strongly monotone SCCs. The case of two agents is considered in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we discuss acceptable mechanisms, that is consistent mechanisms whose outcomes are Pareto optimal.
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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Danilov, V.I., Sotskov, A.I. (2002). Nash-consistent Mechanisms. In: Social Choice Mechanisms. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07715-9
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