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The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks

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Networks and Groups

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

Abstract

This paper studies the formation of networks among individuals. The focus is on the compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. The paper reviews and synthesizes some previous results on the subject, and also provides new results on the existence of pairwise-stable networks and the relationship between pairwise stable and efficient networks in a variety of contexts and under several definitions of efficiency.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. HSS 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, 91125, USA

    Matthew O. Jackson

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  1. Matthew O. Jackson
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, 110016, India

    Bhaskar Dutta

  2. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 228-77, Pasadena, CA, 91125, USA

    Matthew O. Jackson

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jackson, M.O. (2003). The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks. In: Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O. (eds) Networks and Groups. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07719-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24790-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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