Abstract
A general nontransferable utility (NTU) game is interpreted as a collection of pure bargaining games that can be played by individual coalitions. The threatpoints or claims points respectively, in these pure bargaining games reflect the players’ opportunities outside a given coalition. We develop a solution concept for general NTU games that is consistent in the sense that the players’ outside opportunities are determined by the solution to a suitably defined reduced game. For any general NTU game the solution predicts which coalitions are formed and how the payoffs are distributed among the players.
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Gerber, A. (2003). Coalition Formation in General NTU Games. In: Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O. (eds) Networks and Groups. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_13
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