Abstract
This paper introduces a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of sequential network formation, in which players propose links and demand payoffs. Payoff division is therefore endogenous. We show that if the value of networks satisfies size monotonicity, then each and every equilibrium network is efficient. The result holds not only when players make absolute participation demands, but also when they are allowed to make link-specific demands.
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Currarini, S., Morelli, M. (2003). Network Formation With Sequential Demands. In: Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O. (eds) Networks and Groups. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07719-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24790-6
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