Trust and social efficiencies
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In a variant of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, if extra costs are associated with the verifications built into strategies that could otherwise produce Pareto efficient equilibria, the attainment of efficient play becomes problematical. Evolutionary-game versions of this dilemma are studied here in an attempt to understand the difficulties societies face in maintaining efficient interactions mediated by trust.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Expected Payoff Evolutionary Game Symmetric Equilibrium Equilibrium Payoff
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