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Trust and social efficiencies

Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

In a variant of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, if extra costs are associated with the verifications built into strategies that could otherwise produce Pareto efficient equilibria, the attainment of efficient play becomes problematical. Evolutionary-game versions of this dilemma are studied here in an attempt to understand the difficulties societies face in maintaining efficient interactions mediated by trust.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Expected Payoff Evolutionary Game Symmetric Equilibrium Equilibrium Payoff 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBoston UniversityBostonUSA

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