Abstract
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game.
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Lagunoff, R., Matsui, A. (2003). Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric?. In: Ichiishi, T., Marschak, T. (eds) Markets, Games, and Organizations. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-53465-2
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