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Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric?

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Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Stochastic Game Repeated Game Strategy Profile Coordination Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorgetown UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Faculty of EconomicsUniversity of TokyoBunkyo-ku, TokyoJapan
  3. 3.Institute of Policy and Planning SciencesUniversity of TsukubaIbarakiJapan

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