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Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution

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Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

Abstract

This paper analyzes a model of bargaining in which two parties use a mediator who sequentially makes random proposals until agreement by both parties is reached. I show that as the cost of delay shrinks to zero, the subgame perfect payoff converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights determined by the relative discount rates of the players. I also establish conditions for the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium for arbitrary discount rates.

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References

  • Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., Wolinsky, A. (1986) The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. Rand Journal of Economics 17: 176–188

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Wilson, C.A. (2003). Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution. In: Ichiishi, T., Marschak, T. (eds) Markets, Games, and Organizations. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-53465-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24784-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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