Abstract
There are decisions which refer to the community as a whole (e.g. the building of long distance roads, the monetary system, the military system, the system of customs) and others which may be left to the individuals. The government may be a large institution with many divisions and departments with different responsibilities and great power on the activities of the individuals such that their liberty is very much restricted. But the government may also be a relatively small organization with very restricted power which gives much liberty to the individuals. There is a system of rules (written or not) called constitution which determines the power and the organizations of the government and the way how the deciding personalities in the government are selected.1 The constitution is supposed to be valid for a long time (in the German constitution (“Grundgesetz”) the essential characteristics of a democracy are supposed to be valid “forever”, see “Grundgesetz”, art. 79 III). Actually, the historical constitutions changed substantially in time, and this change is the answer of the society to changes in the economic and social situation and of the experience on the shortcomings of the old constitution. Here lies the connection of economics and the constitutional law.
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Krelle, W.E. (2003). The Theory of the Government. In: Economics and Ethics 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24733-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24733-3_5
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