Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Obstacles to Growth and Competition: The Political Economy of Corruption and Rent-seeking in Russia

  • Chapter
Economic Opening Up and Growth in Russia

  • 112 Accesses

Abstract

Since the meltdown of the financial sector and a short-lived dip downwards of overall production, which followed suit after the financial crisis in August 1998, the Russian economy has stabilized fairly well and achieved a remarkable high level of economic growth during at least three consecutive years by 2002. This surprisingly fast recovery was largely based on a surge in oil and gas prices on the world market and a sharp increase in international competitiveness of the Russian tradables sector after the large devaluation of the Ruble. Other factors like a more stable macroeconomic environment and major reform efforts may have played a crucial role as well. In 2000, economic growth in Russia was among the highest in the region, with an annual rate of 8.3 %; 1999 and 2001 saw growth rates of around 5 %; in 2002 growth slowed again to slightly more than 4 % (Tab. G1). These growth rates are encouraging, and one might conclude that only now, after almost a decade of recession, the Russian economy is bound to catch up with other more advanced transition countries like Poland and Hungary.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • ARROW, K.J. (1969): The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in: The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PBB-System, Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Bd. 1, Washington D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • ASLUND, A. (1996): Rentoorientirovannoe povedenie v rossiiskoi ekonomike, in: Voprosy ekonomiki, Nr. 8 /1996, 99–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • BECK, P.J., MAHER, M.W. (1986): Comparison and Bribery in Thin Markets, in: Economic Letters, Vol. 20, 1–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • BERKOVITZ, D., DEJONG, D.N. (1999): Russia’s Internal Border, in: Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 29, 633–649.

    Google Scholar 

  • BERKOVITZ, D., DEJONG, D.N. (2001): The Evolution of Market Integration in Russia, in: Economics of Transition, Vol. 9, Nr. 1, 87–104.

    Google Scholar 

  • BROADMAN, H.G. (2000): Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry, World Bank Working Paper Nr. 2330, Washington D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • BROWN, J.D., EARLE, J.S. (2000): Competition and Firm Performance: Lessons from Russia, SITE Working Paper Nr. 154, Stockholm.

    Google Scholar 

  • COMMANDER, S., MUMSSEN, C. (1999): Understanding Barter in Russia, EBRD Working Paper Nr. 37, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • EARLE, J.S., ESTRIN, S. (1998): Privatization, Competition and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in Russia, SITE Working Paper Nr. 128, Stockholm.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBRD (1999): Transition Report 1999, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • EBRD (2002): Transition Report 2002, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • ELISSEEVA, I.I. (1999): Price Dynamics in the Russian Food Market, Heidelberg: Physica.

    Google Scholar 

  • FRYE, T., SHLEIFER, A. (1997): The Invisible and the Grabbing Hand, in: The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 87, 354–358.

    Google Scholar 

  • GÖTZ, R. (2002), Das russische Bruttoinlandsprodukt im internationalen Vergleich, in: Osteuropa Wirtschaft, Vol. 47, Nr. 4, 319–336.

    Google Scholar 

  • HAYEK, F.A. von (1968): Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, Tübingen.

    Google Scholar 

  • HELLMAN, J.S., JONES, G., KAUFMANN, D. (2000): “Seize the State, Seize the Day”. State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Nr. 2444, Washington D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • HOPPMANN, E. (1977): Marktmacht und Wettbewerb, Tübingen: Mohr.

    Google Scholar 

  • INDEM (2002): Diagnostika rossijskoj korruptsii: Sotsiologicheskij analiz, Moskau.

    Google Scholar 

  • JOHNSON, J. (1997), Russia’s Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups, in: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 13, Nr. 4, 333–365.

    Google Scholar 

  • KALI, R. (2002), Contractual Governance, Business Groups and Transition, in: Economics of Transition, Vol. 10, Nr. 2, 255–272.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • KORNAI, J. (1986): The Soft Budget Constraint, in: Kyklos, Vol. 39, Nr. 1, 3–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • LIEN, D.H.D. (1986): A Note on Competitive Bribery Games, in: Economic Letters, Vol. 20, 337–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • LYNCH, A. (2002): Roots of Russia’s Economic Dilemmas: Liberal Economics and Illiberal Geography, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, Nr. 1, 31–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2002): Economic Survey: Russian Federation, Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • PEROTTI, E.C., GELFER, S. (2001), Red Barons or Robber Barons? Governance and Investment in Russian Financial Industrial Groups, in: European Economic Review, Vol. 45, 1601–1617.

    Google Scholar 

  • PINTO, B., DREBENTSOV, V., MOROZOV, A. (2000): Dismantling Russia’s Nonpayments System. Creating Conditions for Growth, World Bank Technical Paper Nr. 471, Washington D.C.

    Google Scholar 

  • POPOVA, T. (1998), Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs) and Their Roles in the Russian Economy, in: Review of Economies in Transition, 7 /1998, 5–28.

    Google Scholar 

  • PRITZL, R.F.J. (1997): Korruption und Rent Seeking in Lateinamerika. Zur Politischen Ökonomie autoritärer politischer Systeme, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • RADAEV, V. (1999): Wie in Russland Märkte entstehen: Vertragsdurchsetzung und Markteintritt, Berichte des BIOst Nr. 41, KSln.

    Google Scholar 

  • RAJAN, R.G., SERVAES, H., ZINGALES, L. (1998), The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, Nr. 1, 35–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ROSE-ACKERMAN, S. (1999): Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • SCHRODER, H.-H. (1999), El’tsin and the Oligarchs: The Role of Financial Industrial Groups in Russian Politics between 1993 and July 1998, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, Nr. 6, 957–988.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • SHIN, H., STULZ, R. (1998), Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient? in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, 531–552.

    Google Scholar 

  • SHLEIFER, A., VISHNY, R.W. (1994): Politicians and Firms, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, 995–1025.

    Google Scholar 

  • STEIN, J. (1997), Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Ressources, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 111–134.

    Google Scholar 

  • STIGLER, G.J. (1975): The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • STROUTCHENEVSKI, A. (2002): The Performance of Savings and Investments in Russia, Russian Economic Trends — Quarterly Issue, Vol. 11, No. 2, 31–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2001): 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • WIEGERT, R. ( 2003 ): Transformationskrise, Wachstumserfordernisse und Wettbewerbsblockade in Rußland, Heidelberg: Physica.

    Google Scholar 

  • WORLD BANK (2002): Transition — the First Ten Years. Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • ZAOSTROVTSEV, A. (2000): Rent Extraction in a Rent Seeking Society, Spider Working Paper Series Nr. 10, St. Petersburg: Stockholm University, St. Petersburg State University.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Ralf Wiegert
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Troika Dialog, 4 Romanov pereulok, 125009, Moscow, Russia

    Evgeny Gavrilenkov

  2. University of Wuppertal, Gaußstr. 20, 42119, Wuppertal, Germany

    Paul J. J. Welfens (Jean-Monnet-Professor for European Economic Integration President of EIIW) (Jean-Monnet-Professor for European Economic Integration President of EIIW)

  3. European Institute for International Economic Relations (EIIW), Potsdam University, August-Bebel-Str. 89, 14482, Potsdam, Germany

    Ralf Wiegert

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Wiegert, R. (2004). Obstacles to Growth and Competition: The Political Economy of Corruption and Rent-seeking in Russia. In: Gavrilenkov, E., Welfens, P.J.J., Wiegert, R. (eds) Economic Opening Up and Growth in Russia. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24729-6_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24729-6_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05803-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24729-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation