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A Secure and Practical CRT-Based RSA to Resist Side Channel Attacks

  • ChangKyun Kim
  • JaeCheol Ha
  • Sung-Hyun Kim
  • Seokyu Kim
  • Sung-Ming Yen
  • SangJae Moon
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3043)

Abstract

A secure and practical CRT-based RSA signature scheme is proposed against side channel attacks, including power analysis attack, timing attack, and fault analysis attack. The performance advantage obtained over other existing countermeasures is demonstrated. To prevent from fault attack, the proposed countermeasure employs a fault diffusion concept which is to spread the fault into the correct term during the recombination process by using CRT. This new countermeasure is also secure against differential power attack by using the message random blinding technique on RSA with CRT.

Keywords

CRT DPA Fault attack RSA Side channel attack Smart card 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • ChangKyun Kim
    • 1
  • JaeCheol Ha
    • 2
  • Sung-Hyun Kim
    • 3
  • Seokyu Kim
    • 3
  • Sung-Ming Yen
    • 4
  • SangJae Moon
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceKyungpook National Univ.DaeguKorea
  2. 2.Division of Information ScienceKorea Nazarene Univ.Cheonan, ChoongnamKorea
  3. 3.System LSI DivisionSamsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Korea
  4. 4.Dept of Computer Science and InformationEngineering National Central Univ.Chung-LiTaiwan, R.O.C.

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