Abstract
The analysis in Chap. 5 reveals that the possibility of bank runs induces bank shareholders to prefer investments in low-risk assets and to provide the bank with enough capital in order to reduce the probability of runs occurring. A natural question that arises is whether or not the bank can prevent runs by another means than providing large amounts of capital. This chapter analyzes one of these possibilities: deposit insurance.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ziegler, A. (2004). Deposit Insurance. In: A Game Theory Analysis of Options. Springer Finance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24690-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24690-9_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05846-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24690-9
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