Abstract
In this research, we propose group dynamics that promotes cooperative behavior in the so-called Social Dilemmas and enhances the performance of systems. If cooperative behavior among self-interest individuals is established, effective distribution of resources and useful allocation of tasks based on coalition formation can be realized. In order to realize group dynamics, we extend the partner choice mechanisms for 2-IPD to that for N-person Dilemma game. Furthermore, we propose group split based on metanorm. As a result of simulations with an evolutionary approach, we confirm i) the establishment and maintain of cooperation, and ii) the enhancement of the performance of the systems consisting of self-interest players by group dynamics based on mutual choice in the Social Dilemmas.
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Yamashita, T., Axtell, R.L., Kurumatani, K., Ohuchi, A. (2004). Investigation of Mutual Choice Metanorm in Group Dynamics for Solving Social Dilemmas. In: Kurumatani, K., Chen, SH., Ohuchi, A. (eds) Multi-Agent for Mass User Support. MAMUS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3012. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24666-4_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24666-4_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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