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Sign-Based Differential Power Analysis

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Information Security Applications (WISA 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2908))

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Abstract

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) by Paul Kocher et al. is expanded with the information that is hidden in the sign of power biases. The latter reveal values that collide with the DPA target value within the circuitry. With the help of cross-iteration comparisons, the interpretation of those values can provide significant amounts of the information required to reverse engineer secret algorithm. We have successfully launched a demonstration attack on a secret authentication and session-key generation algorithm implemented on SIM cards in GSM networks. The findings provide guidance for designing tamper resistant devices that are secure against this kind of attack.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jozef Stefan Institute, Jamova 39, 1000, Ljubljana, Slovenia

    Roman Novak

Authors
  1. Roman Novak
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Ewha Womans University, Korea

    Ki-Joon Chae

  2. Computer Science Department, Google Inc. and Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, NY 10027, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Novak, R. (2004). Sign-Based Differential Power Analysis. In: Chae, KJ., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2908. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24591-9_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24591-9_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20827-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24591-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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