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Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler pp 215–236Cite as

Das institutionelle Design parlamentarischer Demokratien: Zum Zusammenspiel von Wahl- und Gesetzgebungssystemen

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Dieser Beitrag betrachtet das Design parlamentarischer Demokratien mit Blick auf den Wert politischer Gleichheit. Politische Gleichheit ist einer der zentralen Grundwerte der Demokratie. Unsere Kernfrage bezieht sich auf die institutionelle Verwirklichung dieses Grundwerts: Wie sollten parlamentarische Demokratien gestaltet sein, damit die Interessen aller Bürger bei kollektiv verbindlichen Entscheidungen gleich berücksichtigt werden? Diese Frage ist vielschichtig, und das Ziel des Beitrags ist nicht, eine umfassende und eindeutige Antwort zu geben.. Wir wollen stattdessen zwei Komplikationen beleuchten, die bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage auftreten und die bisher nicht hinreichend systematisch gewürdigt wurden.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Potsdam, Deutschland

    Steffen Ganghof & Christian Stecker

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  1. Steffen Ganghof
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  2. Christian Stecker
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Steffen Ganghof Christoph Hönnige Christian Stecker

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Ganghof, S., Stecker, C. (2009). Das institutionelle Design parlamentarischer Demokratien: Zum Zusammenspiel von Wahl- und Gesetzgebungssystemen. In: Ganghof, S., Hönnige, C., Stecker, C. (eds) Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91773-3_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91773-3_14

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

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