Many social and collective properties and notions are collectively man-made. There are two important features of the collective creation of some central aspects of the social world that have previously been emphasized in the literature – by such authors as Barnes (1983), Bloor (1997), Kusch (1997), and Searle (1995)). The first feature is that of the performative character of many social notions. The second is the reflexive nature of many social concepts. My account adds to this list a third feature, the collective availability or „forgroupness“ of collective social items.
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Tuomela, R. (2009). Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality. In: Gerhard, P. (eds) Neuer Mensch und kollektive Identität in der Kommunikationsgesellschaft. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91471-8_15
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