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Machtindexanalyse und Europäische Zentralbank

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Die politische Ôkonomie des EU-Entscheidungs prozesses

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Der Beitritt von zehn neuen Mitgliedern zur Europäischen Union (EU) im Mai 2004 hat in der akademischen Diskussion viel Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Dies gilt auch für die möglichen Folgen der Erweiterung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (EWU) (z.B. Bacaria et al. 2002; Berger 2002; De Grauwe 2002; Gros et al. 2002; Hefeker 2002; Hendrikx/Maier 2002). Es wird vermutet, dass die Einführung des Euro in den neuen Mitgliedsländern-insbesondere in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern - zu einem inflationären Schub der Gemeinschaftswährung führen wird. In diesem Zusammenhang sind auch die Veränderungen der Entscheidungsprozesse innerhalb der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) von Bedeutung. Die Akteure innerhalb der EZB, deren Abstimmungsverhalten sowie die entsprechenden Abstimmungsregeln in Verbindung mit den geltenden Transparenzregeln, beeinflussen die Inflationserwartungen des Privatsektors.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl för Wirtschaftspolitik der, Duachland

    Christian Fahrholz

  2. Mitarbeiter am Zentrum för Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim

    Philipp Mohl

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  1. Christian Fahrholz
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  2. Philipp Mohl
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© 2008 VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

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Fahrholz, C., Mohl, P. (2008). Machtindexanalyse und Europäische Zentralbank. In: Die politische Ôkonomie des EU-Entscheidungs prozesses. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91012-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91012-3_4

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-531-15406-0

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