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Zum Stand der Dinge: Spieltheoretische Modelle des Gesetzgebungsprozesses in der Europäischen Union

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Die politische Ôkonomie des EU-Entscheidungs prozesses

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Wie lassen sich die Ergebnisse des Gesetzgebungsprozesses in der Europäischen Union (EU) am besten erklären? Neo-Institutionalistische Erklärungsversuche, die auf dem sogenannten Rational- Choice- Ansatz (Holler 2003) basieren, gehen bei der Analyse des Zustandekommens von Sekundärgesetzgebung in der EU von der Annahme aus, dass die legislativen Zuständigkeiten, die im Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und im Vertrag über die Europäische Union festgelegt sind, eine entsprechende Berücksichtigung bei der Analyse von Entscheidungsprozessen finden müssen.2

Der Dank der Autoren gilt der Niederländischen Organisation für Wissenschaftliche Forschung (NWO) für ihre finanzielle Unterstützung. Dieses Kapitel basiert auf einem englischsprachigen Artikel des ersten Autors (Selck 2004a).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Klinikum Derby, Großbritannien

    Constanze Kathan

  2. Universität Nottingham, Großbritannien

    Torsten J. Selck

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  1. Constanze Kathan
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  2. Torsten J. Selck
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Kathan, C., Selck, T.J. (2008). Zum Stand der Dinge: Spieltheoretische Modelle des Gesetzgebungsprozesses in der Europäischen Union. In: Die politische Ôkonomie des EU-Entscheidungs prozesses. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91012-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91012-3_3

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