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Soziale Normen und Reziprozitat

Die Bedeutung „sozialer“ Motive für die Rational-Choice-Erklärung sozialer Normen
Chapter

Auszug

Informelle soziale Normen mit Sanktionen gehören zweifellos zu den wichtigen Bausteinen der sozialen Ordnung. Tatsächlich lautet eine der Grundannahmen des sogenannten „normativen Paradigmas“, für das insbesondere die Parsons-Tradition steht, dass gesellschaftliche Ordnung ohne eine verbindliche Anerkennung bestimmter Normen der Kooperation unmöglich entstehen bzw. stabil bleiben kann.

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Anmerkungen

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Copyright information

© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule ZürichDeutschland

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