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Soziale Normen und Reziprozitat

Die Bedeutung „sozialer“ Motive für die Rational-Choice-Erklärung sozialer Normen

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Book cover Rational Choice: Theoretische Analysen und empirische Resultate

Auszug

Informelle soziale Normen mit Sanktionen gehören zweifellos zu den wichtigen Bausteinen der sozialen Ordnung. Tatsächlich lautet eine der Grundannahmen des sogenannten „normativen Paradigmas“, für das insbesondere die Parsons-Tradition steht, dass gesellschaftliche Ordnung ohne eine verbindliche Anerkennung bestimmter Normen der Kooperation unmöglich entstehen bzw. stabil bleiben kann.

für wertvolle Hinweise bedanken wir uns bei Matthias Näf

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  1. Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Deutschland

    of Dr. Andreas Diekmann & of Dr. Thomas Voss

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Andreas Diekmann Klaus Eichner Peter Schmidt Thomas Voss

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Diekmann, A., Voss, T. (2008). Soziale Normen und Reziprozitat. In: Diekmann, A., Eichner, K., Schmidt, P., Voss, T. (eds) Rational Choice: Theoretische Analysen und empirische Resultate. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90866-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90866-3_6

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