Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Zwei ungleiche Schwestern? Die Cohabitation und das divided government im Vergleich

  • Chapter
Res publica semper reformanda

  • 3592 Accesses

Auszug

Die Vergleichende Regierungslehre lebt vom Systemvergleich. Jenseits des unbestreitbaren Prinzips „alles ist vergleichbar — wenn auch nicht gleich“, stellt sich in der Forschung jedoch immer wieder die Frage nach dem sinnvollen Vergleich. Für (1994, 18): „Many of us would be hard pressed to state whether we prefer eating a bushel of pears or seeing Senator Kennedy elected president.“ Manche Dinge sind eben doch nicht gleich und auch nur bedingt sinnvoll vergleichbar. Im wissenschaftlichen Kontext sollte ein Vergleich zweckgerichtet in Hinblick auf ein Erkenntnisziel sein, wobei die „Angemessenheit der Vergleichskriterien“ den sinnvollen Vergleich gewährleisten (vgl. Abromeit und Stoiber 2006, 19). Es stellt sich also die Frage, zu welchem Zweck man „Äpfel und Birnen“ vergleicht (vgl. Sartori 1991, 245).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Literatur

  • Abromeit, Heidrun und Stoiber, Michael (2006) Demokratien im Vergleich. Einführung in die vergleichende Analyse politischer Systeme, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, Alberto and Rosenthal, Howard (1995) Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Binder, Sarah A. (1999) ‘The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-1996’, American Political Science Review 93: 519–533.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bingham Powell,Jr. G. (1991) ‘“Divided Government“ as a Pattern of Governance’, Governance 4(3): 231–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brady, David and Volden, Craig (1998) Revolving Gridlock, Boulder: Westview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burns, James MacGregor (1963) The Deadlock of Democracy. Four-Party Politics in America, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cameron, Charles (2000) Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, John J. (1999) ‘Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness’, American Political Science Review 93: 821–835.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Colomer, Josep M. (2001) Political Institutions. Democracy and Social Choice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Copeland, Gary (1983) ‘When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation’, Journal of Politics 45: 696–710.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew (1991) ‘Divided Control of Fiscal Policy’, in: Cox, Gary W. and Kernell, Samuel (eds.) The Politics of Divided Government, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 155–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cutler, Lloyd N. (1988) ‘Some Reflections about Divided Government’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 17: 485–492.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, Maurice (1980) ‘A new Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government’, European Journal of Political Research 8(2): 165–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, George C. III., Barrett, Andrew and Peake, Jeffrey (1997) ‘The Legislative Impact of Divided Government’, American Journal of Political Science 41: 545–563.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, Robert (2001) ‘What is Divided Government?’, in: Elgie, Robert (ed.) Divided Government in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–20.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, David and O’Halloran, Sharyn (1996) ‘Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test’, Journal of Politics 58: 393–417.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, David and O’Halloran, Sharyn (1999) Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, Morris P. (1991) ‘Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory’, Governance 4(3): 236–249.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, Morris (1992) Divided Government, New York: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, Mark N. and Hirczy de Mino, Wolfgang P. (1998) ‘Separated Powers, Divided Government, and Turnout in U.S. Presidential Elections’, American Journal of Political Science 42: 316–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilmour, John B. (2002) ‘Institutional and Individual Influences on the President’s Veto’, Journal of Politics 64(1): 198–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gschwend, Thomas and Leuffen, Dirk (2005) ‘Divided We Stand — Unified We Govern? Cohabitation and Regime Voting in the 2002 French Elections’, British Journal of Political Science 35: 691–712.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James und Jay, John (1993) Die Federalist Papers (übersetzt, eingeleitet und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Barbara Zehnpfennig), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helms, Ludger (1999) ‘Präsident und Kongress in der legislativen Arena. Wandlungstendenzen amerikanischer Gewaltenteilung am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts’, ZParl 30: 841–864.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman, Stanley (1966) ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’, Daedalus 95(3): 862–915.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howell, William, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron and Charles Riemann (2000) ‘Measuring the Institutional Performance of Congress in the Post-War Era: Surges and Slumps in the Production of Legislation, 1945-1994’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25(2): 285–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, Charles O. (1995) Separate but Equal Branches. Congress and the Presidency, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jun, Uwe (2002) ‘Koalitionen in der V. Republik Frankreichs: Stabile Mehrheiten unter Exekutivdominanz’, in: Kropp, Sabine, Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S. und Sturm, Roland (Hrsg.), Koalitionen in West-und Osteuropa, Opladen: Leske + Buderich, S. 137–166.

    Google Scholar 

  • König, Thomas und Bräuninger, Thomas (2005) Gesetzgebung im Föderalismus, Speyerer Forschungsberichte 237, Speyer: Forschungsinstitut für öffentliche Verwaltung.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krehbiel, Keith (1998) Pivotal Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laver, Michael and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1990) ‘Coalitions and Cabinet Government’, American Political Science Review 84(1990): 873–890.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laver, Michael and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1991) ‘Divided Government: America is not exceptional’, Governance 4, 250–269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehmbruch, Gerhard (2003) Verhandlungsdemokratie. Beiträge zur vergleichenden Regierungslehre, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leuffen, Dirk (2006) Wenn zwei sich streiten, freut sich der Dritte? Divided government im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem der EU, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 13(2): 201–227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leuffen, Dirk (2007) Cohabitation und Europapolitik. Politische Entscheidungsprozesse im Mehrebenensystem, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Massot, Jean (1997) Alternance et cohabitation sous la Ve République, Paris: La documentation française.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayhew, David R. (1991) Divided we Govern: Party control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990, New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKay, David (1994) ‘Divided and Governed? Recent Research on Divided Government in the United States,’ British Journal of Political Science 24, 517–534.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milner, Helen (1997) Interests, Institutions, and Information. Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrow, James (1994) Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, Wolfgang C., Bergman, Torbjörn and Kaare Strom (2003) ‘Parliamentary Democracy: Promise and Problems’, in: Strom, Kaare, Müller, Wolfgang C. and Bergman, Torbjörn (eds.) Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neustadt, Richard E. (1960) Presidential Power. The Politics of Leadership, New York and London: John Wiley & Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oberreuter, Heinrich (1978) ‘Gewaltenteilung — Theorie und Praxis’, in: Weber, Jürgen (Hrsg.), Konflikt und Integration II. Perspektiven des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München: Olzog, 93–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parodi, Jean-Luc (1997) ‘Proportionnalisation périodique, cohabitation, atomisation partisane: un triple défi pour le régime semi-présidentiel de la Cinquième République’, Revue française de science politique, 47(3): 297–312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peterson, Paul E. and Greene, Jay P. (1994) ‘Why Executive-Legislative Conflict in the United States is Dwindling’, British Journal of Political Science 24: 33–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfiffner, James P. (1991) ‘Divided Government and the Problem of Governance’, in: Thurber, James A. (ed.) Divided Democracy. Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress, Washington: CQ Press, 39–60.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierce, Roy (1991) ‘The Executive Divided against Itself: Cohabitation in France, 1986-1988’, Governance, 4(3), 270–294.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Robert (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games’, in: International Organization 42(3), 427–60.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, Robert D. (1993) ‘Two-Level Games: The Impact of Domestic Politics on Transatlantic Bargaining’, in: Haftendorn, Helga and Tuschhoff, Christian (eds.) America and Europe in an Era of Change, Boulder: Westview Press, 69–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rhode, David W. and Simon, Dennis M. (1985) ‘Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response: A Study of Institutional Conflict’, American Journal of Political Science 29: 397–427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sartori, Giovanni (1991) ‘Comparing and Miscomparing’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(3): 243–257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scharpf, Fritz W. (2000) Interaktionsformen. Akteurzentrierter Institutionalismus in der Politikforschung, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shugart, Matthew Soberg (1995) ‘The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government’, American Political Science Review 89(2): 327–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steffani, Winfried (1979) Parlamentarische und präsidielle Demokratie. Strukturelle Aspekte westlicher Demokratien, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stüwe, Klaus (2004) ‘Konflikt und Konsens im Bundesrat. Eine Bilanz (1949-2004)’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 50-51: 25–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sundquist, James (1988) ‘Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States’, Political Science Quaterly 103: 613–635.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players: An Introduction to Institutional Analysis, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weatherford, Stephen M. (1994) ‘Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policy Making’, British Journal of Political Science 24: 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zadra, Dirk (1997) Der Wandel des französischen Parteiensystems. Die ‚présidentiables’ in der V. Republik, Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zürich, Deutschland

    Dr. phil. Dirk Leuffen (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter)

Authors
  1. Dr. phil. Dirk Leuffen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Werner J. Patzelt Martin Sebaldt Uwe Kranenpohl

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2007 VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Leuffen, D. (2007). Zwei ungleiche Schwestern? Die Cohabitation und das divided government im Vergleich. In: Patzelt, W.J., Sebaldt, M., Kranenpohl, U. (eds) Res publica semper reformanda. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90763-5_27

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90763-5_27

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-531-15393-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-531-90763-5

  • eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Science (German Language)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation