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On the economic efficiency of direct democracy

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Abstract

Fifteen years ago North (1990, [1992]) commented on the role of institutions in society as follows: “They are the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies. If we are ever to construct a dynamic theory of change, …, it must be built on a model of institutional change.” (p. 107). North’s assertions sparked an intense debate about the role of political and economic freedoms in the economic development of states, which reached its (interim) peak in the so-called MIT-Harvard controversy. Whereas Acemoglu et al (2005) emphasize the direct positive influence of democratic constitutions on economic performance, Glaeser et al (2004) attribute only an indirect effect to the institutional factors and see the formation of human capital as the decisive factor in the prosperity of states.

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Zoltán Tibor Pállinger Bruno Kaufmann Wilfried Marxer Theo Schiller

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Feld, L.P., Kirchgässner, G. (2007). On the economic efficiency of direct democracy. In: Pállinger, Z.T., Kaufmann, B., Marxer, W., Schiller, T. (eds) Direct Democracy in Europe. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90579-2_9

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