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Recht und Corporate Governance

Chapter

Auszug

Eine der großen intellektuellen Trennlinien in den modernen Sozialwissenschaften verläuft zwischen Ökonomie und Soziologie. Ökonomen glaubten den Ursprung der modernen Gesellschaft klassischerweise in der Ablösung von Staat und rent seeking Akteuren (privilegierten Interessengruppen) durch profitorientierte Marktakteure zu erkennen (Smith 1904). Indem die „unsichtbare Hand des Marktes“ die Produzenten dazu zwang, miteinander zu konkurrieren, wurde für eine effiziente Allokation der gesellschaftlichen Ressourcen gesorgt, und so wurden sie zur Quelle des „Wohlstands der Nationen“. Während der Ursprung der modernen Gesellschaft von der klassischen Soziologie zwar ebenfalls eng mit der Entstehung von Märkten verknüpft wurde, behielten darin gesellschaftliche Systeme und Teilbereiche wie das Rechtssystem, Normen, Religion, soziale Klassen und das politische System weiterhin die entscheidende Rolle bei der Herausbildung von Firmen und Märkten (25|Durkheim 1997; Marx 1977; Weber 1978, 2001). Marx wie auch Weber haben viele der potentiellen Probleme, die Märkte erzeugen, wie beispielsweise ökonomische Instabilität durch ruinösen Wettbewerb, staatlich gestützte Monopolbildungen sowie die Gefahr, dass Regierungen ihre Staatsgewalt zum eigenen Vorteil missbrauchen, vorhergesehen.

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© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California und Direktor des Center for Culture, Organizations and PoliticsUSA

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