Abstract
This study aims at solving the puzzle of why opposition parties and government backbenchers in parliamentary democracies introduce a considerable amount of bills even though these bills are almost never adopted.
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© 2013 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
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Brunner, M. (2013). Parliamentary Bills as Party Policy Signals. In: Parliaments and Legislative Activity. Studien zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19612-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19612-1_2
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Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-531-19611-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-531-19612-1
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