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Analytische Philosophie (I): Willard Van Orman Quine

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Handbuch Ontologie
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Zusammenfassung

Für die logischen Positivisten war die Ontologie ein Zweig der Metaphysik, der entweder trivial oder sinnlos ist. Und als Heidegger anfing, über ›Sein‹ und ›Nichts‹ zu sinnieren, konnte Carnap zeigen, dass es sich um einen sprachlichen Schnitzer handelte, die Verwechslung von Quantoren und Namen. Für ihn beschreibt legitime Philosophie weder ›Sein‹ noch das was existiert, die Wirklichkeit selbst; vielmehr ist sie eine ›Logik der Wissenschaften‹, die auf deren Methoden und Begriffssysteme reflektiert.

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Glock, HJ. (2020). Analytische Philosophie (I): Willard Van Orman Quine. In: Urbich, J., Zimmer, J. (eds) Handbuch Ontologie. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04638-3_31

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04638-3_31

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-476-04637-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-476-04638-3

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