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Epistemische Normen des Behauptens, des Glaubens und des praktischen Begründens

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dresden, Deutschland

    Pedro Schmechtig

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  1. Pedro Schmechtig
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Correspondence to Pedro Schmechtig .

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  1. Institut für Philosophie, TU Dresden Institut für Philosophie, Dresden, Germany

    Martin Grajner

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Graz Department of Philosophy, Graz, Austria

    Guido Melchior

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Schmechtig, P. (2019). Epistemische Normen des Behauptens, des Glaubens und des praktischen Begründens. In: Grajner, M., Melchior, G. (eds) Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04632-1_33

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04632-1_33

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