»Sinn« and »Besonnenheit«

Abstract

Herder’s rejection of rationalism in general and Kantianism in particular have long been dismissed as idiosyncratic reactions of someone painfully unfamiliar with the central notions of the transcendental approach. In fact, various dismissals steeped in the tradition of critical philosophy, have tended to portray Herder as someone so far removed from the philosophical mainstream of his time that he pronounced vengeful judgments on something that he simply did not understand.¹ Over the last fifteen years or so, however, a réévaluation has taken hold in which Herder’s consistent rejection of Kantianism has gained acceptance and is now seen as a valuable and legitimate epistemic counter-proposal. In this context, his priorization of being over consciousness has been associated with a »›Transzendentalphilosophie‹ der sinnlichen Existenzerfahrung,«² while his philosophy of language, in particular, has been credited as a major contribution to the so-called »linguistic turn« of the late eighteenth century.