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Machtinstitutionalisierung und organisationale Innovationsfähigkeit

  • Willi Küpper
  • Anke Felsch
Chapter
  • 193 Downloads
Part of the Organisation und Gesellschaft book series (OUG)

Zusammenfassung

Die im vorhergehenden Abschnitt als Tendenz zum Monopol gekennzeichnete, unter bestimmten Bedingungen zu erwartende Entwicklungsrichtung der Dynamik von Machtbeziehungen liefert eine wesentliche Deutung für Prozesse der Institutionalisierung von Handlungssystemen oder Handlungsfeldern. Es geht hierbei um die Transformation von Umweltunsicherheit, besonders von strategischer Unsicherheit in mehr oder weniger große Sicherheit, d.h. in erwartbare (kalkulierbare) Aktionen und Reaktionen. Machtspiele verfestigen sich in Spielstrukturen mit mehr oder weniger verbindlichen bzw. akzeptierten Spielregeln, so dass Interaktionsroutinen entstehen bzw. wahrscheinlicherwerden. Wir haben bereits darauf hingewiesen, dass eine solche Entwicklung durch Prozesse der Internalisierung generalisierter Erwartungen (vgl. Abschn. 1.3.2.1) und der Extemalisierung von Zwecken in Ressourcen, Technologien und technologischen Artefakten (vgl. Abschn. 1.3.2.2) begleitet und verstärkt wird. Verstärkungseffekte — auch das wurde des Öfteren betont — werden vor allem dadurch ausgelöst, dass Unsicherheitsreduktion Investitionen in physisches, Human- und Sozialkapital und damit mehr oder weniger hohe sunk costs bedingt, so dass es zur Verfestigung hierauf bezogener Qualifikations- und Interessenstrukturen sowie von Handlungsrationalitäten kommt (vested interests).

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Referenzen

  1. 1.
    Crozier hat schon 1963 als Beispiel für Spielverläufe mit dysfunktionalen Folgen einen bürokratischen circulus vitiosus beschrieben (vgl. Crozier 1968). Versuche einer Verallgemeinerung dieses Konstrukts finden sich bei Masuch (1985). Auf interessante Parallelen zwischen solchen Teufelskreisen in organisationalen Interaktionssystemen und der von Bateson im psychiatrischen und psychotherapeutischen Bereich zur Erklärung von Schizophrenie und Alkoholismus eingeführten double bind-Theorie kann hier nur verwiesen werden (vgl. unter diesem Stichwort verschieden Beiträge in Bateson 1981). In beiden Fällen werden die Wurzeln eines Syndroms nicht beim individuellen Akteur (Irrationalität), sondern in den spezifischen Bedingungen eines sozialen Kontextes (Spielstrukturen) freigelegt (vgl. Küpper/Ortmann 1986, Anm. 8 auf S. 600).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Hierzu gehören auch die im vorigen Abschn. 1.4 diskutierten organisationsübergreifenden Machtstrategien.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Dies kann im Einzelnen bedeuten: Sicherstellung eines reibungslosen Ablaufs, Vermeidung von Störungen, Zuverlässigkeit der Leistung Rechtfertigungstrategien, die an Vorkehrungen für die Möglichkeit einer persönlichen Erfolgszuschreibung und der Vermeidung von Misserfolgszuschreibungen anknüpfen.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Vgl. allgemein zur Bedeutung des Zeithorizontes für den Aufbau von Machtbeziehungen S. 28.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Die Unterschiede zu den Bestimmungen der Anreiz-Beitrags-Theorie sollen hier nicht diskutiert werden (vgl. Ortmann 1976).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Z.B. Unsicherheiten der Output environment (Einflüsse demographischer Veränderungen auf Produkt- und Markttrends etc.), der Input environment (die Versorgungssituation mit wichtigen Rohstoffen etc.), der Throughput environment (neue Entwicklungen der Prozesstechnologie etc.), der Administrative environment (neue Planungs-, Gestaltungs- und Kontrollverfahren etc.) oder der Regulatory environment (Steueränderungen, Ergebnisse von Gerichtsverfahren etc.) (vgl. Hambrick 1981 unter Bezugnahme auf Miles/Snow 1978).Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    “The approach in this paper, suggested by Hickson et al. (1971: 219), is to conceive of a dominant environmental requirement as impinging on any of the three stages in an open system: input, throughput, or output (Katz and Kahn 1966). One can conceive of severe raw material or personnel scarcities as environmental constraints on the input process. External pressures for lower costs or faster throughput are primarily directed at the throughput process. New product technologies, changing market preferences, and competitors’ product initiatives impose environmental requirements on the organization’s output. In reality, the three stages are interdependent and cannot be isolated. However, for purposes of this study, it is useful to conceive of a dominant environmental requirement as having primary impact on one of three stages” (Hambrick 1981, 255).Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Z.B. in der Typologie von Miles/Snow (1978) die Marketing- und Innovationsstrategien von Prospectors bei Dominanz der Output environment und die Kosten- und Qualitätsstrategien der Defenders bei Dominanz der Throughput environment (vgl. Fn. 6, S. 131).Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Hambrick berücksichtigt im Unterschied zu Hickson et al. die Möglichkeit, dass die tatsächlich beobachtete dominante Strategie einer Organisation von der passenden Strategie abweichen kann, ohne die Gründe für solche Abweichungen und die Stabilität einer solchen Situation zu analysieren (vgl. die Hinweise von Hambrick 1981, 267ff., auf die Notwendigkeit einer nicht unternommenen Analyse der Machtdynamik).Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Während nach evolutionstheoretischen Ansätzen (besonders in der Ausprägung der sog. populationsökologischen Modelle, vgl. Hannan/Freeman 1977 und kritisch hierzu Bekker/ Köpper/Ortmann 1992) die Variabilität organisationaler Strukturformen hauptsächlich durch die Geburt von neuen und das Sterben von alten Organisationen zustande kommt, gehen kontingenztheoretische Ansätze i.d.R. davon aus, dass sich Organisationen durch Strukturänderungen an die Anforderungen ihrer Umwelt anpassen (vgl. z.B. Lawrence/Lorsch 1967). In beiden Fällen wird eine Konsistenz(naturalfit) von Umweltmerkmalen und organisationalen Strukturmerkmalen postuliert.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    “Although these efficiency arguments are plausible, it is not obvious that they are correct. Many detailed accounts of organizational processes raise serious doubts that organizations minimize the costs of completing many kinds of transactions. Indeed, there appears to be a strong tendency for organizations to become ends in themselves and to accumulate personnel and an elaborate structure far beyond the technical demands of work. Moreover, many organizations perform very simple tasks that involve low levels of coordination. In contrast, collections of skilled workers collaborating in ad hoc groups can often complete quite complex tasks. From the perspective of the performance of a single, complex collective action, it is not obvious that a permanent organization has any technical advantage” (Hannan/Freeman 1984, 152f.).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Die von uns weiter oben beschriebenen Institutionalisierungsprozesse in Gründungs- und kritischen Wachstumsphasen von Organisationen lesen sich in dieser Sichtweise wie folgt: “Testing for accountability is especially intense during organization building, the process of initial resource mobilization. Potential members want assurance that their investments of time and commitment will not be wasted. When membership involves an employment relation, potential members often want guarantees that careers within the organization are managed in some rational way. Potential investors (or supporters) also assess accountability. In fact, the profession of public accountancy arose in the United States in response to the desires of British investors in American railroads for assurances that their investments were being managed in appropriate ways (Chandler, 1977). Demands for accounting rationality in this narrow sense are both widespread and intense in modern societies. For example, the federal government will not allocate research grants and contracts to organizations that have not passed a federal audit, meaning that they have given evidence of possessing the appropriate rules and procedures for accounting for the use of federal funds. Accountability testing is also severe when resources contract. Members and clients who would otherwise be willing to overlook waste typically change their views when budgets and services are being cut” (Hannan/Freeman 1984, 153). “Selection within organizational populations tends to eliminate organizations with low reliability and accountability. The selection processes work in serveral ways. Partly they reflect testing by key actors and environments in the organization-building stage. Potential members, investors, and other interested parties apply tests for reliability and accountability to proposed new ventures. Such testing continues after founding. Unreliability and failures of accountability at any stage in a subsequent lifetime threatens an organization’s ability to maintain commitment of members and clients and its ability to acquire additional resources” (ebd., 154).Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    “In our judgement, pressures for accountability are especially intense when (1) organizations produce symbolic or information-loaded products (e.g., education, branded products versus bulk goods) — see DiMaggio and Powell (1983); (2) when substantial risk exists (e.g., medical care); (3) when long-term relations between the organization and its employees or clients are typical; and (4) when the organization’s purpose are highly political (Weber, 1968). Our arguments presumably apply with special force to organizations in these categories” (Hannan/Freeman 1984, 153).Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    “Thus we argue that the properties that give some organizations reproducibility also make them highly resistant to structural change, whether designed or not. As we noted above, this means that some aspects of structure can be changed only slowly and at considerable cost (many resources must be applied to produce structural change). Such structures have a dead-weight quality; there are large lags in response to environmental changes and to attempts by decision makers to implement change. Since lags in response can be longer than typical environmental fluctuations and longer than the attention spans of decision makers and outside authorities, inertia often blocks structural change completely. The inertia of reproducible organizations is usually viewed as a pathology. A classic statement of this position is Merton’s (1957) essay on the ‘dysfunctions of bureaucracy’. High levels of inertia may produce serious mismatches between organizational outcomes and the intentions of members and clients in situations in changing environments. But, as we argued earlier (Freeman and Hannan 1983), organizations that frequently try to reorganize may produce very little and have slight chances of survival. Here the issue is the cause of structural inertia rather than its consequences. Our argument is that resistance to structural change is a likely byproduct of the ability to reproduce a structure with high fidelity...” (Hannan/Freeman 1984, 155).Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Im Einzelnen werden hierzu folgende Begründungen gegeben: “Newly created organizations apparently have lower levels of reproducibility than older ones. As Stinchcombe (1965) pointed out, new organizations typically have to rely on the cooperation of strangers. Development of trust and smoothly working relationships take time. It also takes time to work out routines. Initially there is much learning by doing and comparing alternatives. Existing organizations have an advantage over new ones in that it is easier to continue existing routines than to creat new ones or borrow old ones (see the discussion in Nelson and Winter, 1982: 99–107). Such arguments underlie the commonly observed monotonically declining cost curve at the firm level — the so-called learning curve. In addition, the reliability and accountability of organizational action depend on members having acquired a range of organization-specific skills (such as knowledge of specialized rules and tacit understandings). Because such skills have no value outside the organization, members may be reluctant to invest heavily in acquiring them until an organization has proven itself (see Becker, 1975). Once an organization survives the inital period of testing by the environment, it becomes less costly for members to make investments in organization-specific learning — early success breeds the conditions for later success. Thus collective action may become more reliable and accountable with age simply because of a temporal pattern of investments by members. Moreover, the collective returns to investments in organizationspecific learning may take time to be realized, just like the case for other forms of human capital. For both of these reasons, the levels of reliability and accountability of organizational action should increase with age, at least initially. Once members have made extensive investments in acquiring organizationspecific skills, the costs of switching to other organizations rise. Consequently the stake of members in keeping the organization going tends to rise as it ages. Finally, processes of institutionalization also take time. In particular, it takes time for an organisation to acquire institutional reality to its members and to become valued in its own right” (Hannan/Freeman 1984, 157). “Processes of external legitimation also take time. Although an organization must have some minimal level of public legitimacy in order to mobilize sufficient resources to begin operations, new organizations (and especially new organizational forms) have rather weak claims on public and official support. Nothing legitimates both individual organizations and forms more than longevity. Old organizations tend to develop dense webs of exchange, to affiliate with centers of power, and acquire an aura of inevitability. External actors may also wait for an inital period of testing to be passed before making investments in exchange relations with new organizations. Thus processes of institutionalization in the environment and exchange relationships with relevant sectors of the environment may account for the relationships stated in Theorems 2 and 3. The argument to this point cannot distinguish between the internal and external sources of the relationships” (ebd., 158).Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    “When links among subunits of an organization are hierarchical, one unit can change its structure without requiring any adjustment by other units outside its branch. However, when the pattern of links is nonhierarchical, change in one subunit requires adjustment by many more subunits. Such adjustment processes can have cycles; change in one unit can set off reactions in other units, which in turn require adjustment by the unit that initiated the change. Long chains of adjustments may reduce the speed with which organizations can reorganize in response to environmental threats and opportunities” (Hannan/Freeman 1984, 162).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Willi Küpper
  • Anke Felsch

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